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This chapter examines changing attitudes to social norms related to five aspects of family life, 
including choosing to remain childless, cohabitation without marriage, children born outside 
of marriage, full-time work with young children, and divorce with children. Using data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) we look at changes in UK attitudes between 2006/7 and 2018/19. 
We also consider comparisons between the UK and a set of European countries. 
Family life
Attitudes to non-traditional family behaviours
Spotlight 
Attitudes in the UK have become more liberal between 2006/07 and 2018/19 towards all five family 
behaviours. In terms of the level of disapproval, the rank order of the norms remains unchanged, 
with respondents in both years most likely to disapprove of divorce with children aged under 12, 
and least likely to disapprove of choosing never to have children. Levels of disapproval fell in more 
or less equal proportions across the behaviours. 
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Overview
Changing attitudes to family behaviour
Attitudes in the UK have become more liberal between 2006/07 and 2018/19 towards all five 
of the family behaviours we asked about. 
• Between 2006/07 and 2018/19, the proportion disapproving fell for remaining childless from 
8% to 6%, for having children while cohabiting from 21% to 12%, and for divorcing while a 
child was younger than 12 from 28% to 16%. 
• In both years people were most likely to disapprove of divorce with children aged under 12, 
and least likely to disapprove of choosing never to have children. 
• Alongside the continuing declines in disapproval, there have been substantial decreases in 
the proportion who neither approve nor disapprove, resulting in increases of more than 20 
percentage points in those approving of childlessness, cohabitation (in general and with a 
child) and divorcing while a child is under 12.
Generations and social norms
Changes in attitudes to non-traditional family behaviours can operate through the changing 
composition of the population over time.
• The passing of the generation born before 1928 has contributed to the overall decline in 
disapproval.
• Disapproval of divorce with children under 12, and of working full-time with young children, 
has fallen between 2006/07 and 2018/19 among every birth cohort in the sample.
Comparisons between the UK and Europe 
In the UK and across a range of European countries, the direction of travel is towards a less 
prescriptive, more laissez-faire attitude among the public towards fertility and family choices 
by both men and women.
• Disapproval of childlessness, cohabitation and having children outside marriage has fallen 
sharply in every country represented in the data. 
• Countries in eastern Europe remain more disapproving of these behaviours than elsewhere.
• Disapproval of working full-time with young children is lower overall and less differentiated 
between countries.
• The UK has a similar attitudinal profile on these questions to Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands.
The National Centre for Social Research
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Introduction
This chapter examines changing attitudes to social norms related 
to a number of aspects of family life, including choosing to remain 
childless, cohabitation without marriage, children born outside 
of marriage, full-time work with young children, and divorce with 
children. First, it discusses the concept of social norms and their 
role within debates about society and politics. Second, it describes 
the dataset on which the chapter is based, namely the European 
Social Survey (ESS), the ‘timing of life’ module that has been fielded 
twice on the ESS twelve years apart (on ESS round 3 in 2006/7, and 
on ESS round 9 in 2018/19), and the specific items upon which the 
analysis is performed. Third, it presents findings on family norms in 
the UK and comparisons with a set of European countries. A short 
fourth section concludes.
Social norms and the ‘Family’ 
Social norms are the sets of values, behaviours and unwritten rules 
that govern behaviour in groups and societies. They are regarded as 
representations of acceptable behaviour. Social norms have had an 
important place in sociology since the nineteenth century, and in social 
life for far longer. Durkheim (1893) argued that such norms were crucial 
to maintaining social cohesion in the urban and industrial societies that 
were emerging at the time. In order to prevail, these norms required 
either widespread consensual support, or a system of sanctions for 
those who did not conform. In traditional societies the Church often 
took on the role as enforcer of social norms; in modern, more secular 
societies, this role is associated more with the legal system and 
bureaucracy acting on behalf of the state. At more micro-levels of 
society, most local communities and voluntary associations use social 
norms to maintain their cohesion. In fact it is difficult to think of any ‘in-
group’ that does not have stated social norms which it enforces.
For as long as there have been social norms there has probably been 
concern about their erosion or total breakdown. The sociology of 
deviance is a catalogue of ‘dangerous’ out groups (young people, any 
number of sub-cultures, and latterly migrants) that are thought to 
have threatened the cohesion of society. A different sort of threat, 
and the one that is the subject of this chapter, has been a perceived 
decline in standards of personal morality, manifested in the 
breakdown of the traditional nuclear family and behavioural norms 
associated with it. These concerns go back at least as far as the 
‘permissive society’ of the 1960s and reached their apogee in the 
1990s with the short-lived and ill-fated ‘Back to Basics’ slogan of the 
then Conservative government.
In sociological terms, the weakening of many of these traditional 
moral, lifestyle and life-course norms stems from the secularisation 
that was ushered in by a century of industrialisation and urbanisation. 
These economic processes also transformed the meaning and role of 
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the family as an economic unit. The norms around family and fertility 
are very divisive. Those of a liberal inclination praise the new freedom 
of individuals (mostly female) to make their own choices about life 
events such as childbearing and childrearing, not to mention the 
more diverse range of family models on offer beyond the traditional 
two-parent model that was dominant until the 1960s. On the other 
hand, many social conservatives hold the ‘breakdown of the family’ to 
be at the heart of a range of social ills, ranging from low educational 
attainment of children in one-parent families to criminality among 
young men growing up without male role models. The expansion of 
female labour force participation, and the accompanying increase in 
the number of dual-worker households, are also criticised by 
conservative commentators for undermining traditional gender roles 
and family stability. 
It is worth remembering that each of the five norms that are 
discussed in this chapter (childlessness, cohabitation without 
marriage, children born outside of marriage, full-time work with young 
children, and divorce with children) were, until relatively recently, 
strongly policed and their transgression involved considerable 
(frequently gendered) stigma. Women who remained childless 
attracted the uncomplimentary epithet ‘spinster’. Those who chose to 
cohabit might be described as ‘living over the brush’, or ‘living in sin’. 
Children born out of wedlock were labelled as ‘illegitimate’ (or worse) 
and their families would go to considerable lengths to mitigate or 
conceal this fact – the ‘shotgun wedding’ is an allusion to such 
mitigations – and it was not unknown for single women to give a baby 
up for adoption, or exceptionally to allow the child to be raised by 
another relative. As late as the 1980s, children with working parents 
who returned from school to an empty house might still be referred to 
as ‘latch-key kids’. Finally, the phrases ‘staying together for the 
children’ and ‘coming from a broken home’ give some indication of 
the prevailing attitudes to divorce and its effects on children.
Attitudes to these issues have steadily ‘loosened’ since the 1980s. A 
review of the British Social Attitudes data in the thirty years after 1983 
concluded that there was an increasing sense of ‘live and let live’ 
when it comes to our views on other people’s relationships and 
lifestyles. It noted that “generational trends make it likely that this 
shift…will continue, although it is important to recognise that events 
can upset even seemingly long-term and deep-rooted shifts in 
opinion” (Park et al., 2013:19). The 2010s have been marked by the 
rise of populist political movements, many of which hold socially 
conservative views and promote adherence to more traditional 
values. The decision of the UK to leave the European Union in 2016 
reversed a forty-year trend towards greater integration with the 
continent. Events can have an impact on seemingly inexorable trends.
At the same time, many of the once stigmatised behaviours outlined 
above are now far more common than they once were. In the UK, 
between 2008 and 2018 the number of cohabiting couple families 
increased from 2.7 to 3.4 million (representing about 18% of all 
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families). Lone parent families account for 2.9 million of all families 
(15%). Between 1996 and 2017 the proportion of dependent children 
living in cohabitating households rose from 7% to 15% (ONS, 2017, 
2018). Slightly more than a fifth live in lone-parent families, though the 
proportion has changed little in the last two decades. Of course, the 
fact that a phenomenon is widespread is not in itself a sign of moral 
approval, but the greater visibility it has in public life and the more 
common it becomes as a personal experience, the more it becomes 
a de facto norm.
The importance of social norms around family life for key life-course 
decisions (and the potential reproduction or disruption of the norms) 
has been noted in the relevant literature (Liefbroer et al., 2010), as has 
the gendered nature of patterns of disapproval in relation to 
childlessness, of working full-time while having children, and of the 
family life course in general (Rijken and Merz, 2014). These papers all 
emphasise the presence of the ‘gendered double standard’, in other 
words that there is a difference in society’s views towards the 
behaviour of men and women. This implies a residual traditionalism in 
respect of gender roles within the broader liberalising trend. 
Given that attitudinal changes to social norms were already evident at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, and that the prevalence of 
those norms has continued to erode in the last two decades, the rest 
of this chapter addresses four questions. First, has the slow tide of 
liberalisation continued in relation to attitudes to personal morality 
and lifestyles? Second, are there any differences between specific 
types of behaviour or are they all subject to an increase in 
generalised social tolerance? Third, have gendered double standards 
faded or do they persist? Fourth, is there continued evidence of a 
‘generational effect’ or are attitudes changing throughout the 
population?
The data 
The data on which the analysis is based is drawn from two rounds of 
the European Social Survey (ESS). First conceived in the mid-1990s, 
the ESS is a cross-sectional cross-national general social survey, 
carried out every two years in a large number of countries – 38 have 
participated in at least one round and 14 have done so in every round 
since its inception in 2002.1
Round 3 of the European Social Survey included a module on ‘The 
Timing of Life: The Organisation of the Life Course in Europe’. In 
Round 9 a subset of the original module was fielded again (for a full 
description of the module’s aims and content see European Social 
Survey, 2018).
1  Unlike the BSA series which draws a representative sample of those aged 18 years and over, 
the ESS draws a representative sample of the population aged 15 and over in each participating 
country. This chapter reports on data from the UK (including Northern Ireland which is not 
included in BSA), as well as other ESS countries. Fieldwork for ESS Round 3 was carried out in 
2006/2007, and for Round 9 in 2018/2019.
The National Centre for Social Research
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The concept of norms about family behaviour was measured by a set 
of five items. These were asked as follows:
How much do you approve or disapprove if a woman/man…
…chooses never to have children?
…lives with a partner without being married?
…has a child with a partner she/he lives with but is not  
married to?
…has a full-time job while she/he has children aged under 3?
…gets divorced while she/he has children aged under 12?
Respondents could answer on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘strongly 
approve’ to ‘strongly disapprove’. Half the sample was randomly 
assigned to be asked the questions with references to a woman, and 
half to a man.
Changing attitudes to family behaviour in 
the UK
Norm by norm analysis
While the five items can be thought of as measuring an underlying 
concept (norms about family behaviour) we would still expect some 
variation between the items. Harrison and Fitzgerald (2010) found this 
to varying degrees in relation to 2006/07 data for eleven countries. 
Table 1 summarises the responses to each of the five items.












Remain childless 2006/07 % 8 70 22 2394
2018/19 % 6 53 41 2204
Cohabitation 2006/07 % 14 60 26 2394
2018/19 % 8 47 44 2204
Children while 
cohabiting
2006/07 % 21 57 22 2394
2018/19 % 12 46 43 2204
Full-time work 
with child under 3
2006/07 % 20 42 37 2394
2018/19 % 11 37 52 2204
Divorce with 
children under 12
2006/07 % 28 60 13 2394
2018/19 % 16 54 30 2204
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in  
the UK
The National Centre for Social Research
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Table 1 shows that attitudes have become more liberal between 
2006/07 and 2018/19 towards all five norms. For example, between 
2006/07 and 2018/19, the proportion disapproving fell for remaining 
childless (from 8% to 6%), for having children while cohabiting (from 
21% to 12%), and for divorcing while a child was younger than 12 
(from 28% to 16%). Regarding the level of disapproval, the rank order 
of the norms remains unchanged, with respondents in both years 
most likely to disapprove of divorce with children aged under 12, and 
least likely to disapprove of choosing never to have children. Levels of 
disapproval fell in more or less equal proportions across the 
behaviours. 
In 2006/07 the proportion of respondents with a neutral position 
(neither approving nor disapproving) was very high – above half of the 
responses, except for the question about combining full-time work 
with caring for a child under three years old. This question exhibited 
the greatest degree of polarisation, with 20% disapproving, 37% 
approving and 42% neutral. On each of the first four items, the level 
of approval exceeded the level of disapproval. The exception was the 
question of divorce, where those who disapproved outnumbered 
those who approved by more than two to one.
What has changed in the intervening twelve years is that alongside 
the continuing declines in disapproval, there have been substantial 
decreases in the ‘neutral’ category, resulting in increases of more 
than 20 percentage points in those approving of childlessness, 
cohabitation (in general and with a child) and divorcing while a child is 
under 12. In the case of working full-time with a child under 3, what 
was already the largest level of approval has now become a majority 
(52%). It is difficult to interpret the declining proportions in the middle 
category. One intriguing idea is that it marks a shift in attitude from 
one of basic ‘tolerance’, a sort of studied indifference, to an active 
acknowledgement of such behaviours as appropriate and desirable 
choices for those individuals who make them.
Indexes of disapproval and approval
It is useful to make a distinction between the recognition of a norm in 
the sense of an established (if not necessarily ideal) model for 
behaviour, and the social judgement passed upon the breaking of 
that norm. There is some distance between a society that tolerates 
pluralism and divergence from established norms, and one where 
multiple life course choices and behaviours are not only accepted, 
but encouraged, sometimes celebrated, and perceived as being 
equally valid, both legally and ‘morally’. We begin this section by 
getting a feel for the intensity of disapproval for those who transgress 
norms of family life, using a social disapproval index. However, a 
better measure of the trajectory to full social liberalism may not be 
the absence of disapproval, but the presence of approval. Therefore, 
we go on to consider also a social approval index.
The National Centre for Social Research
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The social disapproval index was constructed by coding respondents 
as ‘1’ if they report ‘disapproving’ or ‘strongly disapproving’ of a norm 
being broken. Other values are coded to 0. This produces a range of 
possible values for the index from 0 (disapprove of none) to 5 
(disapprove of all).2 The resulting scores are shown in Table 2. In 
2006/07 around half the sample did not express disapproval for any 
of the five behaviours. In 2018/19 this has increased to around seven 
in ten. In 2006/07, only 12% were consistent disapprovers, taking a 
negative view of three or more of the five. In 2018/19 this has 
decreased to 7%. In both 2006/07 and 2018/19 only 1% of the 
sample disapproved of all five. 




None 1 2 3 4 All Unweighted 
base
2006/07 % 51 24 13 7 4 1 2394
2018/19 % 71 16 6 4 2 1 2204
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in  
the UK
Given this overwhelming absence of public censure, it is tempting to 
announce the death of social norms in relation to fertility and the 
family, although it might be premature to suggest that ‘anything goes’. 
Table 3 shows the opposite set of responses, in an index of social 
approval, where those answering ‘approve’ or ‘strongly approve’ 
score 1 on each item.
Table 3 Number of non-traditional family behaviours approved of, 2006/07 and 2018/19
Approve or 
Strongly approve 
None 1 2 3 4 All Unweighted 
base
2006/07 % 47 23 9 9 7 5 2394
2018/19 % 34 16 8 10 14 19 2204
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in  
the UK
Two salient features emerge from Table 3. The first is the reminder 
that there is some distance between not disapproving and actively 
approving. In 2006/07, while it was the case that half the sample 
2  The following analysis makes use of both a disapproval and an approval index, so it is useful 
to establish the degree to which the five items do measure the same underlying concept, using 
an exploratory factor analysis. The results showed that they did indeed form a single factor, 
explaining 48% of the variance, based on the 2006 UK data. For the 2018 data this increased 
to 63%. In terms of the correlations between the items, the first three relating to childlessness, 
cohabitation and raising a child in a cohabiting relationship, had the strongest inter-correlations, 
and had more explanatory power on their own than with the other two items. However, the five 
items cohere sufficiently by conventional statistical criteria to be considered as representing a 
single factor.
The National Centre for Social Research
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disapproved of none of the five items, around half did not approve of 
any either. Around a quarter only approved of one out of five. Around 
one in ten respondents approved of four, or all, of the five. The 
second notable finding is the extent to which this has changed in the 
intervening 12 years. Respondents are now distributed much more 
evenly across the scale. A third still approve of none of the items, but 
the proportion of ‘strong social liberals’ who approve of four or five of 
the items is now also approaching a third, a close to threefold 
increase on the share of the 2006/07 sample. Around a fifth of 
respondents now approve of all five behaviours. 
When placed together, these two indexes show that, since 2006/07, 
there has been movement at both ends of the attitude spectrum. 
Outright disapproval has declined; there is a large increase in strong 
social liberalism; the proportion of ‘qualified approvers’ (who approve 
of two or three of the items) has stayed constant. 
The gendered double standard
One of the distinctive features of the ‘timing of life’ module is the ‘split 
ballot’ design, in which respondents are randomly assigned sets of 
questions which relate to either women or men. Harrison and 
Fitzgerald (2010) showed that in eleven countries there was a massive 
disparity between disapproval of women and men when it came to 
working full-time with a young child (with people more likely to 
disapprove of a woman working with a young child), and a more 
modest gap between disapproval of men, as against women, in 
relation to the divorce item in ten of the eleven countries, with people 
being more likely disapprove of a man with a child divorcing, than 
when asked about a woman. 
Table 4 re-examines the gendered nature of family norms by 
comparing the two datasets. The data show the persistence of the 
gendered double standard in relation to full-time work and divorce, 
but at lower ‘absolute’ levels of disapproval. In relation to the first 
three norms – childlessness, cohabiting and having children while 
cohabiting – disapproval has fallen with reference to both men’s and 
women’s behaviour. In both 2006/07 and 2018/19 the small 
differences in disapproval when asked about men and women for 
these items are not significant. 
What are significant changes are those pertaining to working full-time 
with a small child. With the continued expansion of female labour-
force participation, albeit within the context of incomplete and often 
expensive childcare provision, disapproval for this pattern of working 
motherhood has halved in a little more than a decade, while attitudes 
to working fatherhood have not shifted outside the margin of error 
(although disapproval was already at a very low rate). Reactions to 
this are likely to be ambivalent. On the one hand, this is a major 
closing of the gap in attitudes – itself a form of social prejudice – 
towards the norms appropriate for women and men in a relatively 
short period. On the other hand, four times as many respondents are 
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critical of the idea of a woman with young children doing a full-time 
job than a man in a comparable situation. In a previous analysis of 
eleven ESS countries, Harrison and Fitzgerald (2010) observed ‘The 
issue of maternal employment and child-rearing may be one domain 
where social attitudes will not get any more liberal; alternatively this 
may be the next stage of social liberalisation waiting to happen’ 
(2010:152). Revisiting this a decade on, there has certainly been a 
substantial degree of movement on this particular norm, although 
attitudes are still some way off the parity we see in respect of other 
measures. Disapproval of divorce has also fallen markedly, but the 
difference in attitudes to women and men getting divorced when 
children are very young has not. There is still a 10 percentage-point 
difference, with more disapproval towards men.
Table 4 % disapproving of life-course behaviours, by sex asked about, 2006/07 and 
2018/19 
Asked about women Asked about men
% Disapprove or Strongly 
disapprove
2006/07 2018/19 2006/07 2018/19
Childless 8 4 8 7
Cohabiting 14 8 14 10
Children in Cohabitation 21 10 20 13
Full-time work child under 3 37 17 3 4
Divorce when children under 12 23 12 32 22
Unweighted base 1213 1143 1175 1043
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in  
the UK
The motor of change: generations and social norms
Accounting for long-term shifts in social norms and attitudes to them 
is a challenging task. Unlike political revolutions, social revolutions 
tend to grind fine but slowly. In relation to family norms, there are 
many potential drivers of change at the individual level – for example, 
an individual’s religious beliefs, marital status, and educational level 
can influence their attitudes. At the aggregate, societal level, changes 
in religious traditions, socio-economic circumstances, and legal 
underpinnings can also influence changing norms. At the same time, 
the portrayal of such norms in popular culture may also lead to 
changes in attitudes.
Age is another important factor in relation to interpreting any set of 
norms regarded as ‘traditional’. Older people might be thought to be 
more likely to support traditional norms, but attitudes of different age 
groups may also change over time as social norms shift. One 
approach to analysing social change is to use the theory of 
generations (Mannheim, 1923). The basis for measurement is not the 
location of the individual in some notional stage of their life, but their 
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membership of a group of people all born at roughly the same time, 
whose formative experiences have taken place during a particular 
period. These experiences are arguably responsible for shaping many 
attitudes and beliefs which they continue to hold throughout their 
lives. One of the reasons social change is often so gradual is that it 
operates not through such individuals reappraising their values and 
attitudes, but by the changing composition of the population over 
time. This mechanism of ‘generational replacement’ (Abramson and 
Inglehart 1992) is summed up in the old aphorism ‘people never 
change their minds, they just die’.
Table 5 presents a summary of attitudes to each of the five norms 
split not by age, but by birth year, as recorded in the survey. It follows 
the commonly-used conventions in relation to cut points (see for 
example Pew Research Centre 2015 and 2019). The birth years used, 
and the titles they are commonly given, are as follows:
• Born 1901-1927 – the Greatest Generation
• Born 1928-1945 – the Silent Generation
• Born 1946-1964 – the Baby Boomers
• Born 1965-1980 – Generation X
• Born 1981-1996 – Millennials
• Born 1997-2012 – Generation Z
Arbitrary those these are, it allows us to compare results against 
other empirical and theoretical work in the field of generational 
change. 
Those born between 1901 and 1927, often dubbed ‘The Greatest 
Generation’, reached adulthood any time from the end of World War 
One to the end of World War Two. At the time of the 2006/07 survey, 
the youngest respondent would have been 79 years old. By the time 
of the 2018/19 fieldwork period, the lower limit for this group would 
have been 91. No respondents of that age are recorded in the UK 
data. This is the starkest example of a cohort effect. The high levels 
of disapproval on the four items relating to cohabitation, children born 
outside of marriage, working and divorcing parents reflect an 
upbringing and education that is now beyond the memory of the 
living. The demise of this generation (albeit they formed only around 
5% of the weighted sample in 2006/07) is a partial explanation for the 
overall shift in attitudes.
The National Centre for Social Research
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Childless 2006/07 % 16 9 4 8 10 n/a
2018/19 % - 7 5 6 5 6
Cohabiting 2006/07 % 43 21 10 10 13 n/a
2018/19 % - 21 7 10 5 6
Child while 
cohabiting
2006/07 % 50 33 18 14 13 n/a
2018/19 % - 30 10 10 8 7
Full-time work 
with child under 3
2006/07 % 39 34 16 16 16 n/a
2018/19 % - 21 13 9 7 9
Divorce with 
children under 12
2006/07 % 53 41 20 23 24 n/a
2018/19 % - 30 18 16 11 17
Unweighted base 2006/07 184 555 732 628 288 n/a
2018/19 - 334 749 541 475 89
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in  
the UK
n/a = not eligible in that round
Those born between 1928 and 1945 (the ‘Silent Generation’) are 
represented in both samples. Aged between 61 and 78 in 2006/07 
and in the later survey between 73 and 90, this cohort did not move 
significantly in its attitudes to childlessness, cohabiting or children 
born outside marriage. However, there was a drop of around 10 
percentage points in those disapproving of working and divorcing 
parents, although they remained the most disapproving generation in 
the survey. The most well-known of generations, the ‘baby boomers’ 
(born 1946-64) did not significantly change their attitudes to family 
norms over the period 2006/07-18/19 with the exception of children 
born outside marriage, where there was an 8 percentage-point 
decline in those disapproving. 
The following generation born between 1965 and 1980 (‘Generation 
X’) changed little in their disapproval of remaining childless or 
cohabiting (where levels were already low). However, the proportion 
disapproving of having children outside marriage fell by 4 percentage 
points, working parents by 7 points, and divorcing with young 
children 7 points. The Millennial generation (sometimes called 
‘Generation Y’) plays an important part in the overall pattern of 
societal attitudes. Born between 1981 and 1996, they are given that 
name because they all became adults after 2000. During the first data 
collection point in 2006/07, only those born before 1992 would have 
been eligible for inclusion in the sample, with the remainder of the 
cohort being included in the 2018/19 round. This may partially explain 
the quite dramatic falls in disapproval between the two surveys; the 
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proportion of this group expressing disapproval dropped by more 
than half with regard to every norm, with the exception of children 
born outside marriage, where it fell by a third.
Finally, in 2018/19, the Greatest Generation was replaced by the older 
part of the cohort born since 1997, with all those born before 2004 
eligible for inclusion (and comprising about 8% of the sample in 
2018). Their levels of disapproval are low by comparison with previous 
generations, all being in single figure percentages, with the exception 
of divorcing while children are under 12, where about one sixth of the 
cohort disapproved of this behaviour. 
The main points of this analysis overall are as follows. First, the 
disappearance of the more socially conservative Greatest Generation 
(1901-1927) between the two surveys has some effect on the overall 
proportions, although they already represented a small fraction of the 
sample. Second, the Silent Generation (1928-1945) represent a 
declining share of the sample between data points (down from more 
than a quarter to less than a sixth), and this also contributes to the 
overall changes. Third, there is a marked difference between the five 
questions asked. For the first three (childlessness, cohabiting, and 
children outside marriage) the attitudes within each generation have 
remained broadly consistent, though younger cohorts have become 
more positive towards cohabitation. When it comes to combining full-
time work with childcare and divorcing when children are very young, 
there has been a decline in disapproval in every cohort, even those 
born before the end of World War Two. In other words, while 
generational replacement largely accounts for the modest changes in 
respect of childlessness and cohabitation, the other norms have been 
subject to both a ‘cohort’ and ‘period effect’, in that respondents in 
every age band have become more accepting. 
The UK in a European context
The primary focus of this chapter has been on changing attitudes to 
norms of family behaviour in the United Kingdom. The comparisons 
have been over time rather than across countries. However, the 
European Social Survey contains data from a set of countries that 
have taken part in both of the rounds that fielded the module on the 
‘timing of life’ and this makes it possible to compare the UK with 
other countries. This set of countries is geographically representative 
of Europe, as well as providing variation in historical experience and 
economic wealth. We consider next whether the UK is relatively 
socially liberal or conservative in both the level of disapproval and the 
change since 2006/07, compared with these other European 
countries. 
Data for twelve countries are presented: the UK, France, Germany, 
Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Poland, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria.
The following charts (Figures 1-5) show the proportions of 
respondents expressing disapproval of each of the family behaviours 
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in both years. The countries are displayed from left to right, in broadly 
the order in which we would expect them to align in terms of being 
socially conservative or liberal (from more conservative on the left to 
more liberal on the right), given their scores on other attitudinal 
variables in ESS. First are the eastern European former Communist 
countries (Bulgaria, Slovakia and Poland), next the Mediterranean 
countries (Cyprus, Spain, Portugal), followed by the western 
European countries (Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands), and 
finally the Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway).
Regarding their gross domestic product (GDP), the post-communist 
countries have the lowest levels, followed by the Mediterranean 
countries, then all (bar one) of the western European countries with 
the Nordic countries at the top. The Netherlands is the exception, 
with a GDP higher than the Nordic countries. In terms of religiosity, 
the Mediterranean and former Communist countries clearly have the 
highest levels. They are also predominantly Catholic. Lower levels of 
religiosity are found in the Nordic and western European groupings 
where Protestantism is generally, although by no means always, 
prevalent. In terms of the proportion of working women the 
differences between countries are perhaps a little less clear-cut, but 
the pattern is still broadly the same, with the lowest levels in the post-
communist countries and the highest levels in the Nordic countries.
Figure 1 shows the proportions in each country disapproving of a 
person choosing to remain childless. This figure contains the largest 
range of values of any of the five items, with more than four-fifths of 
respondents in Bulgaria disapproving of the decision to remain 
childless in 2006/07. Disapproval is lowest in the Nordic countries 
(5% each in Sweden and Norway in 2018). The UK is similar to the 
Nordic countries in its outlook, with about a third the level of 
disapproval (5% in 2018/19) of its immediate neighbours France (19%) 
and Germany (15%).
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The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in Appendix table A.1 of this chapter
The National Centre for Social Research
British Social Attitudes 37 | Family life: Attitudes to non-traditional family behaviours 15
Figure 2 shows the proportions disapproving of cohabitation in each 
country. This shows a similar pattern, with levels of disapproval of 
cohabitation falling across the period. Absolute values of disapproval 
are lower for cohabitation than for remaining childless and, except for 
the post-Communist countries and Cyprus, there is a broad similarity 
between countries.
 
Figure 2 % disapproving of cohabitation, by country, 2006/07 and 2018/19
35 35 34 29
























































The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in Appendix table A.1 of this chapter
Figure 3 shows levels of disapproval of having a child outside of 
marriage. This again shows a similar pattern of results with the 
proviso that in many countries, levels of disapproval are higher when 
a child is introduced into a cohabiting relationship. The lingering norm 
of choosing to get married when offspring are imminent appears to 
have some limited traction.
 





























































2006/07 2018/19  
The data on which Figure 3 is based can be found in Appendix table A.1 of this chapter
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Figure 4 show disapproval of a person divorcing when a child is 
under 12. For this behaviour again the post-Communist countries 
take the most socially conservative position on divorce at both time 
points. Levels of disapproval in the other western European countries 
are higher than in the UK. By 2018/19 only the UK, Sweden and 
Norway had less than a fifth of respondents disapproving of divorcing 
while children were still under 12.
 




































































The data on which Figure 5 is based can be found in Appendix table A.1 of this chapter
The final family behaviour produces a different pattern of results. 
Figure 5 shows disapproval of a person working full-time while a child 
is aged under 3. In this figure there is less difference between the 
countries, and less change between 2006/07 and 2018/19, than for 
the previous items. Germany and the Netherlands score as high for 
disapproval of parents working full-time as Bulgaria and Slovakia, and 
Cyprus has the lowest disapproval rating of all countries bar Norway. 
By 2018/19 the UK had a similar profile to the Nordic countries.
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The data on which Figure 5 is based can be found in Appendix table A.1 of this chapter
The factors driving between-country differences in social attitudes 
are complex. The predictors of generalised social tolerance – such as 
the strength and reach of organised religion – may be supplemented 
by other factors when it comes to a specific item such as working 
full-time with small children. These would include the country’s type 
of ‘welfare regime’ – the provision of state services such as childcare 
and welfare payments, along with the regulation of the labour market. 
While the UK is conventionally seen as representing a different social 
‘model’ from that of the Nordic states, it exhibits a very similar pattern 
of attitudes to family norms.
Conclusions
The results reported here paint a remarkably consistent set of 
pictures. First, in the UK and across a range of European countries, 
the direction of travel is towards a less prescriptive, more laissez-faire 
attitude among the public towards fertility and family choices by both 
men and women. This goes further than the decline of disapproval 
and its replacement with passive tolerance. Increasing numbers of 
the public actively approve of individuals who elect to depart from 
‘traditional’ norms in the way they ‘do family life’. Second, although all 
five measures follow the same trajectory in the UK, the relative levels 
of disapproval to each are unchanged. The least contentious norm is 
remaining childless, where the UK has the lowest levels of 
disapproval outside Scandinavia. The UK public is also increasingly 
relaxed about couples cohabiting and having children inside that 
relationship, with only around one in ten disapproving. This is also the 
case in relation to parents of small children choosing to work full-time 
– the behaviour that has seen the largest reduction in disapproval 
over the period. Even in respect of the most frowned upon practice, 
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namely divorcing when children are involved, only around a sixth of 
respondents now actively disapprove.
There are systematic differences within this story, along lines of 
generation and sex. Younger people are more accepting of the 
transgression of family norms. In respect of some norms relating to 
divorce and combining paid work with childcare, acceptance has 
increased in the last decade within every birth cohort. Within this 
pattern, some gendered ‘double standards’ exist in terms of 
acceptable behaviour by men and women. Four times as many 
respondents disapprove of a woman working full-time when her child 
is under 3, than they do a man in the same position. Conversely, 
twice as many would disapprove of a man with young children 
divorcing than they would a woman doing the same. ‘Gender 
traditionalism’ cuts both ways.
At least in relation to norms of fertility, family formation and 
dissolution, the United Kingdom is a socially liberal country and 
becoming steadily more so. This is true both in absolute terms and 
relative to many other European countries, though on each of the five 
measures discussed here there is substantial international 
convergence. 
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Bulgaria 83 65 35 23 36 21 29 24 57 31 1400 2198
Slovakia 54 45 35 31 40 32 27 26 49 41 1766 1083
Poland 53 32 34 20 30 17 17 12 51 35 1721 1500
Cyprus 59 32 29 16 44 22 9 7 26 29 995 781
Spain 26 12 16 7 18 8 16 15 36 21 1876 1668
Portugal 24 21 12 8 12 7 13 26 25 28 2222 1055
Germany 25 15 11 9 17 13 28 29 34 27 2916 2358
France 31 19 11 8 14 8 21 15 39 21 1986 2010
UK 8 5 14 9 21 11 21 11 27 17 2394 2204
Netherlands 13 8 11 7 14 8 29 23 25 25 1889 1673
Sweden 7 5 3 4 6 6 16 11 17 14 1927 1539
Norway 9 5 8 3 8 3 11 5 29 17 1750 1406
Source: European Social Survey rounds 3 (2006/07) and 9 (2018/19), respondents aged 15+ in each country
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